Despite the good intentions held by Sulla, it was inevitable
that his reforms would ultimately destabilise the republic he sought to fix. The
measures he undertook held the underlying flaw that they relied too much on the
Roman populace to maintain them, whether benefiting them personally or not. By
taking power away from those he deemed abused or unnecessarily held it, he
encouraged dissention and a desire to remove these measures in order for these
people to reclaim the political and personal power they once held; this is seen
particularly in the case of the tribunes. Having attempted to, “deprive the
tribunate of its strength and power”[i],
it remained an issue pushed by those who previously benefited from it for a
decade after Sulla’s dictatorship, “until gradually all the prerogatives of the
tribunes were restored”[ii],
giving them an incentive to pull down the other measures Sulla undertook, one
which they clearly acted on, “playing an important supporting role in [the]
final phase of the Republic”[iii],
for it was they who had the power to give generals their commands, allowing
them to give rise to characters such as Caesar. In essence he placed too much
trust in his redefined oligarchy, for by attempting to reign in radical elements
of obvious discourse, he instead gave reign to, “inertia and irresponsibility”[iv];
elected officials chose to ignore the sections of their roles which were unappealing,
with over half of the consuls alone, “not attested in provincial government”[v],
during the period of 78 to 59BC, a time period in which Badian concludes, “ordered
government may be said to have ceased”[vi].
Such lack of motivation was not present in the desire of the Roman populace to
enjoy the status associated with these positions of power. Sulla, in his
attempts to ease the task of administering the Roman region, unbalanced the
ratio of quaestors to praetors, and to the consulship, intensifying the already
fierce competition for these roles, as double the number of men in the position
of quaestor would have held hopes of gaining these higher offices, an increase
not reflected in the availability of these roles. As such, the Roman elite, “resort[ed]
to illicit tactics to ensure the offices they wanted”[vii],
the threat of violence leading to the obstruction of elections in both 53 and
52BC, with even elected officials, “prevented from going to meetings for fear
of their lives”[viii]. Perhaps
Sulla’s greatest failing, however, is inherent in the position of power he took
to exact his reforms. By attempting to stabilise the republic, Sulla unintentionally
set an example for predominance, showing that absolute authority held by an
individual would not lead to chaos by the evidence of the success found in the
year in which Sulla ruled supreme. The horror of the proscriptions did little to
deter would-be emulators, for Caesar, “imitate[ed] his technique”[ix],
as he sought to unravel the remnants of Sulla’s stabilising measures. Thus, by
the idealistic view of the republic he sought to create, it is evident that Sulla, after the end of his dictatorship, instead led to the destabilisation of Rome itself.
[i]
M. Beard and M. Crawford, Rome in the
Late Republic, Duckworth, London, 1989, P. 9.
[ii]
ibid.
[iii]
ibid.
[iv]
E. Badian, Lucius Sulla: The Deadly
Reformer, Sydney University Press, Redfern, 1969, P. 31.
[v]
ibid. P. 30.
[vi]
ibid.
[vii]
M. Beard and M. Crawford, op. cit. P. 69.
[viii]
ibid. P. 70.
[ix]
E. Badian, op. cit. P. 29.
I am ready to repay my debt. I can't be bothered highlighting each specific change on this post, but I'll send you a track-changes version which makes it all clearer. Be proud - I actually managed to cut some words!! This one sits at 484 words, and I'm actually pretty sure there are some sentences you can cut a bit more with some re-wording (again, I might do that later...) which I've highlighted on said track-changes version. :D
ReplyDeleteDespite Sulla’s good intentions, it was inevitable that his reforms would ultimately destabilise the republic he sought to fix. The measures he undertook depended on the Roman populace to maintain them, and not all of these measures were popular. By taking power away from the corrupt upper classes, he encouraged dissent in his people, who sought to remove his reforms in order that these people might reclaim the political and personal power they once held. This was particularly true in the case of the tribunes. Having attempted to, “deprive the tribunate of its strength and power”[i], the tribunes protested for the restoration of their former power, “until gradually all the prerogatives of the tribunes were restored”[ii], giving the upper classes an incentive to pull down the other measures Sulla put in place. They, “play[ed] an important supporting role in [the] final phase of the Republic”[iii], for it was they who had the power to give generals their commands, allowing them to place figures such as Caesar in power. In essence, he placed too much trust in his redefined oligarchy; by attempting to reign in radical elements of obvious discourse, he instead gave reign to, “inertia and irresponsibility”[iv]. Elected officials chose to ignore the elements of their roles which were unappealing, with over half of the consuls alone, “not attested in provincial government”[v], during the period of 78 to 59BC, a time period in which Badian concludes, “ordered government may be said to have ceased”[vi]. The Roman populace, on the other hand, was motivated by a desire to enjoy the status associated with these positions of power. Sulla, in his attempts to simplify the task of governing the Roman region, unbalanced the ratio of quaestors to praetors, and quaetors to the consulship, and this intensified the already fierce competition for these roles; double the number of men in the position of quaestor would have held hopes of gaining these higher offices, and there were not as many places to fill in these roles as there were potential applicants. As such, the Roman elite, “resort[ed] to illicit tactics to ensure the offices they wanted”[vii], and this threat of violence led to the obstruction of elections in both 53 and 52BC, with even elected officials, “prevented from going to meetings for fear of their lives”[viii]. Perhaps Sulla’s greatest failing, however, was in the position of power he placed himself in to enact his reforms. By attempting to stabilise the republic, Sulla unintentionally set an example for predominance, demonstrating that absolute authority held by an individual would, in fact, not lead to chaos, as others had predicted. The horror of the proscriptions did little to deter would-be emulators, for Caesar, “imitate[ed] his technique”[ix], as he sought to unravel the remnants of Sulla’s stabilising measures. Thus, it is evident that Sulla, while a well-intentioned leader, led to the destabilisation of the Roman Empire after the end of his dictatorship.
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