"It's so much easier to see
the world in black and white. Grey? I don't know what to do with grey."[1]
So says Garrus Vakarian to Commander Shepard, regarding the morality of actions deemed criminal. So too is it impractical to class the dictatorship of Lucius Cornelius Sulla in 81BC as either beneficial or not to the stability of the republic. The measures implemented by Sulla were indeed intended to be beneficial, with many doing so in the first years from their introduction, however this would not last, ultimately costing Rome its republican system. In the opening stages of his dictatorship, Sulla implemented the Great Proscription; the seizing of property and its subsequent sale clearly benefited Rome, stabilising the economy whilst allowing for the removal of disruptive elements as in the case of Samnium. However, the personal debts he owed much of Rome's elite meant that it could be abused with little consequence for selfish means through the complicity of Sulla's secretary, Chrysogonus. As dictator, it was possible for Sulla to remove power from those whose threatening influences could not be removed through the Proscriptions, with the near complete abolition of the equites allowing for the renewed rise of the Senate, while also creating support for his work through the elevation of the Cornelians, the Italians and a portion of the equites. Despite his intentions, Sulla’s measures could not prevent the instability that would cause the end of the republic for he failed to appreciate the complacency his system would breed, the escalation of violence brought about by the increased competition, and the example his ultimate rule would represent to other aspirational figures like Caesar. As such, the dictatorship of Sulla was only to some extent beneficial to his overreaching aim of a stabilised Roman Republic.
The Great Proscription was mostly beneficial
to Sulla's attempts to stabilise the Roman Republic, though its misuse
detracted from its effectiveness in his endeavour It was a
masterpiece of legislation, allowing Sulla to replenish the treasury which had
been reduced significantly in size to fund Marius's side of the Civil War,
securing the future of the Roman economy, whilst allowing Sulla to remove the
elements of Roman society he believed were sources of dissent and instability
within the republic. That is not to say that he was unjust in his
proscriptions; not all those who supported Marius in a physical or financial
manner were added to the list, for those in Sulla's sights were people, “whose
only offense was their wealth”[2],
rather than those he would have reason to seek revenge against. The
proscription and subsequent deaths of almost five thousand citizens, “filled
the public treasury to overflowing”[3],
despite the allocation of, “two talents”[4], each
to those who fulfilled the bounty on a proscribed, and the low prices put on
the auctioned property. Furthermore, through the sale, “to allied and friendly
cities their freedom”[5], that
which for most had been lost over the entire military career of Sulla and
Marius, a total of three hundred and fifty million sesterces were added to the
Roman coffers, as calculated by Beesly. In the freeing of these cities and in
the acquirement of property by individuals at these bargain prices, Sulla,
“bound buyers to his interests”[6],
ensuring support for future changes made under his dictatorship. The
proscription was however abused to some extent, an unavoidable occurrence due
to the many debts accrued by Sulla over the course of the Civil War. Through
Sulla's secretary, Chrysogonus, it was possible for Sextus Roscius of Ameria to
be proscribed, “murdered by two of his kinsmen”[7], and
then through further bribery, have his innocent son, “charged...with having
killed his father”[8]. So too was
it possible for Lucius Sergius Catilina to, “legalis[e] his position”[9], and
further his political career through the proscription of his brother. It is
unlikely that Sulla intended for such abuse of his proscriptions, by the very
nature of the goal of stability he sought, as these actions,
“unravel[led]...the fabric of law and order [Sulla] was attempting to weave”[10].
Indeed, it is evident that he made attempts, however weak, to combat such
negative influences on the stability he was trying to bring, blocking Crassus
from any further official employment after his seizing of unofficially
proscribed property. More severe, and justified, action was unavailable to
Sulla for Baker claims he, “ow[ed] a great many people too much”[11], to
go against their interests too severely, an action which would cause more
instability than that done by the abuse of the proscriptions alone. Therefore,
Sulla's inability to stop the abuse of the Great Proscription detracted from
its ability to increase the stability of the Roman Republic under Sulla's
dictatorship.
Through the powers he gained through the
position of dictator, Sulla could remove those elements of Roman life which
threatened to send the state into chaos and enact measures to prop up the
republic. As dictator, Sulla could do whatever pleased him, even holding, “the
power of life and death”[12],
over his subjects, making his severe changes to the political balance of the
republic rather commonplace in comparison. Such change was necessary should
Sulla have been serious in his efforts to stabilise the republic, as without
creating support for his measures amongst those who had the authority to reject
them as soon as he left office or passed away, his efforts would be for naught.
In order to create such support, Sulla’s political reforms had two stages: the
removal of dissenting forces and the escalation of supporting voices. In the
first, he destroyed Samnium completely, for, as Baker notes, they, “had been a
disruptive force”[13], in Roman
politics through their own selfishness; rather than accept policies that would
benefit the state as a whole, the Samnites instead chose to block such measures,
“in the interests of their own independence”[14],
whether or not such blockage would create enemies against their cause back in
Rome. With the same aim, Sulla drastically reduced the influence of the
equites, who, after their introduction by Gracchus in the late second century
BC, had, “lead to serious discord”[15],
through their lack of responsibility, political interest and major policies,
with Badian calling them, “the chief anarchic force of the nineties”[16]. Sulla
effectively removed the class altogether, giving the majority of their powers
back to the Senate, making it the supreme governing body as it had been prior
to the Gracchi reforms. He achieved this by giving it such power as to prevent
as much as possible decisions made through emotional responses only, securing the
Senate, “from mob rule on the one hand and tyranny on the other”[17].
This cause was aided by the decision to make election to the office by popular
election, allowing for, “men of enlightenment”[18], who
were deemed suitable by the majority to have such legislative authority, rather
than those who backroom politics thought able to keep in line with their
wishes. The legislative power granted to the Senate was also drawn from the consulship,
decreasing the ability to abuse it in a quasi-legal form of tyranny as Marius
had done between 104BC and 100BC through the introduction of a ten year waiting
period between consulships, and the introduction of the quaestorship and
praetorship being prerequisites. To ensure this system was maintained, it was
necessary for Sulla to cement support for it in his newly empowered Senate
through the creation of the Cornelians, elevating personally chosen slaves of
the proscribed to citizenship, an act which created a strong sense of gratitude
and loyalty towards Sulla, while simultaneously making a, “deliberate and
careful choice of new blood”[19], to
introduce to the political sphere. In this way the Italian upper class too were
used to stabilise the republic, Sulla addressing their concerns for he had
recognised that they, “finally threatened to destroy the state”[20]. To
prevent backlash from the displaced equites, the eminent equites were adlected,
concurrently reducing the differences they had previously had with the senators,
thereby stabilising the politically prominent elements of Rome at the time. Clearly,
Sulla’s unique role as dictator allowed for the stabilisation of the political
system in Rome, quelling factions who threatened this aim and elevating those
who could be trusted to maintain the republic.
Despite Sulla’s good intentions, it was inevitable
that his reforms would ultimately destabilise the republic he sought to fix.
The measures he undertook depended on the Roman populace to maintain them, and
not all of these measures were popular. By taking power away from those he
deemed abused or unnecessarily held it, he encouraged dissent in his people,
who sought to remove his reforms in order that these people might reclaim the
political and personal power they once held. This was particularly true in the
case of the tribunes. Having attempted to, “deprive the tribunate of its
strength and power”[21], , the tribunes protested for the restoration
of their former power for a decade, “until gradually all the prerogatives of
the tribunes were restored”[22], giving them the incentive to pull down the
other measures Sulla put in place. They acted upon this, “playing an
important supporting role in [the] final phase of the Republic”[23], through their ability give generals their
commands, allowing the tribunes to place figures such as Caesar in power. In
essence, Sulla placed too much trust in his redefined oligarchy; by attempting
to reign in radical elements of obvious discourse, he instead gave reign to, “inertia and
irresponsibility”[24]; Elected officials chose to ignore the elements
of their roles which were unappealing, with over half of the consuls alone, “not
attested in provincial government”[25],
during the period of 78 to 59BC, a time period in which Badian concludes,
“ordered government may be said to have ceased”[26]. The Roman populace, on the other hand, was
motivated by a desire to enjoy the status associated with these positions of
power. Sulla, in his attempts to simplify the task of governing the Roman
region, unbalanced the ratio of quaestors to praetors, and quaetors to the
consulship, and this intensified the already fierce competition for these roles;
double the number of men in the position of quaestor would have held hopes of
gaining these higher offices, an increase not reflected in the availability of
these roles to them. As such, the Roman elite, “resort[ed] to illicit tactics to
ensure the offices they wanted”[27], the
threat of violence leading to the obstruction of elections in both 53 and 52BC,
with even elected officials, “prevented from going to meetings for fear of
their lives”[28]. Perhaps Sulla’s greatest failing, however, is
inherent in the position of power he took to exact his reforms. By attempting
to stabilise the republic, Sulla unintentionally set an example for
predominance, showing that absolute authority held by an individual would not
lead to chaos by the evidence of the success found in the year in which Sulla
ruled supreme. The horror of the proscriptions did little to deter would-be
emulators, for Caesar, “imitate[ed] his technique”[29], as he sought to unravel the remnants of
Sulla’s stabilising measures. Thus, by the idealistic view of the republic he
sought to create, it is evident that Sulla, after the end of his dictatorship,
instead led to the destabilisation of Rome itself.
Sulla’s dictatorship brought mixed success in
his efforts to bring more stability to the Roman Republic in 81BC. The Great
Proscription was tainted by those who Sulla could not stop due to personal
debts, allowing for people to be wrongly proscribed, benefiting individuals and
creating disharmony amongst Rome. Despite this, the legitimate cases allowed
for the stabilisation of the economy and the removal of dissenting factions
within Roman politics. Stability was the result of Sulla’s reforms to the
political system of Rome, elevating the importance of the Senate through a
reduction of the equites, using the adlection of the Cornelians, Italians and
select equites to ensure this system was maintained. His efforts would come to
nought though, his reforms leading to inactivity with increased competition for
prestige, giving way to violence and setting the example for the ultimate rule
Sulla tried in his measures to prevent. This wide variation in success in
Sulla’s attempts to increase the stability of the republic evidently meant that
his dictatorship was only to some extent beneficial to the stability of the
Roman Republic.
[1] Mass Effect 2, (video),
BioWare Corporation, Edmonton, 2010.
[2] G. P. Baker, Sulla the
Fortunate, John Murray, London, 1927, P. 264.
[3] ibid. P. 265.
[4] Plutarch, translated by R. Warner, Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives, Penguin Books, Victoria,
1962, P. 92.
[5] Plutarch, translated by B. Perrin, Plutarch: Comparison of Lysander and Sulla, Harvard University
Press, London, 1916,
[6] A. H. Beesly, The Gracchi,
Marius, and Sulla, Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1877, P. 183.
[7] Baker, op. cit. P. 264.
[8] Beesly, op. cit. P. 182.
[9] Baker, op. cit. P. 264.
[10] ibid. P. 265.
[11] ibid.
[12] Plutarch, translated by R. Warner, op. cit.
P. 94.
[13] Baker, op. cit. P. 259.
[14] ibid. P. 260.
[15] E. Badian, Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer, Sydney University Press,
Redfern, 1969, P. 22.
[16] ibid. P. 23.
[17] Beesly, op. cit. P. 190.
[18] Baker, op. cit. P. 275.
[19] ibid. P. 272.
[20] Badian, op. cit. P. 22.
[21] M. Beard and M. Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic, Duckworth,
London, 1989, P. 9.
[22] ibid.
[23] ibid.
[24] Badian, op. cit. P. 31.
[25] ibid. P. 30.
[26] ibid.
[27] M. Beard and M. Crawford, op. cit. P. 69.
[28] ibid. P. 70.
[29] E. Badian, op. cit. P. 29.
Bibliography
Bibliography
Badian, E., Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer. Sydney University Press, Redfern. 1969.
Baker, G.
P., Sulla the Fortunate. John Murray,
London. 1927.
Beard, M.
and Crawford, M., Rome in the Late
Republic. Duckorth, London. 1989.
Beesly, A.
H., The Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla.
Longmans, Green and Co., London. 1877.
Bleckmann,
B., A Companion to the Punic Wars.
Blackwell Publishing. 2011.
Mass Effect 2. (video). BioWare Corporation, Edmonton.
2010.
Plutarch,
translated by Perrin, B., Plutarch:
Comparison of Lysander and Sulla. Harvard University Press, London. 1916.
Plutarch,
translated by Warner, R., Fall of the
Roman Republic: Six Lives. Penguin Books, Victoria. 1962.
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